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Article 4

Garfield County v. WHI, Inc.: Omen of Change
for Public Land Access Policy*
1.

INTRODUCTION

In Garfield County v. WHI, Inc., 1 the Tenth Circuit
ruled-much to the delight of interest groups and land management agencies seeking to preserve traditional access to
public lands2-that the United States had standing to sue
in the public's behalf for access by prescription or by a
grant implied under R.S. 2477. The United State's involvement in Garfield County suggests that land management
agencies have begun adopting a policy favoring litigation of
access issues in behalf of the public. This policy promises
action where inaction has long prevailed and is a welcome
addition to the access advocate's arsenal.
But interest groups and land management agencies
should be wary. Litigation can complicate matters which
previously were settled quietly. Courts are likely to demand
more meticulous study and more public input than traditionally has been required. Moreover, as the judicial process is
seldom predictable, a policy of leaving land access issues to
the courts could create unnecessary difficulties. For instance,
while litigation can bring finality to long-standing land access disputes, it may also make it harder to change decisions which later prove undesirable. In a land access context, the results of litigation may be too final. 3 For these

* The author, a third-year student at the J. Reuben Clark Law School,
gratefully acknowledges the insights and critique of Mr. Dean Gardner and Mr.
Ken Paur, attorneys in Region 4 of the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
However, this note represents the independent
research and observations of the author, and views expressed do not necessarily
represent the position of the Department of Agriculture, Mr. Gardner, or Mr. Paur.
The author would also like to thank Dean Constance Lundberg for
encouragement and assistance in this endeavor.
1. 992 F.2d 1061 (lOth Cir. 1993).
2. In this Note, the term "public lands" generally refers to lands managed
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the United States Forest Service (Forest Service), and similar federal agencies to which the public has traditionally had
access. For other definitions of "public lands," see Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of
Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 832 (1993).
3. The effects of precedent and public policy marble the American justice
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reasons, interest groups and land management agencies
would be wise to consider the effect Garfield County will
have on land access policy and dispute settlement.
This Note considers the effects and desirability of Garfield County in a historical, political context. Part II examines the laissez faire approach which agencies, 4 courts, and
Congress have traditionally taken to land access problems.
Part III discusses the manner in which Garfield County
strengthens the position of access proponents and land management agencies. Part IV demonstrates how public demand

system. The influence one decision exerts on future litigation is often apparent only
after time, and the workings of policy in a particular case are often identified only
in retrospect. Public land access decisions show that a lack of clearly defined policy
can "result in inconsistent court rulings" and "conflicts that in some cases could
have been prevented." U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVIC:E, TRAVEL MANAGEMENT: BRINGING PEOPLE AND PLACES TOGETHER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACCESS AND TRAVEL MANAGEMENT STR>\TEGY TEAM 14, 19 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter
TRAVEL MANAGEMENT].
4. The Forest Service and BLM often approach public land management
differently and report to different departments (the Forest Service reports to the
Secretary of Agriculture, while BLM reports to the Secretary of the Interior). However, some similarities in how these agencies approach access issues can be partially explained by their "multiple-use" agendas. See WILLIAM E. SHANDS, FEDERAL
RESOURCE LANDS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS 28 (1979). "Multiple use," as defined in
the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-5:n (1988), means
"management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forests
so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the
American people." Section 528 of that Act specifically mentions "outdoor recreation"
in an alphabetical list of permissible uses. Another federal statute defines multiple
use, as it relates to both Forest Service and BLM lands, similarly. Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988). For these
reasons, this Note treats the policies of these agencies as being comparable except
where clearly distinguishable.
Because BLM, the Forest Service, and other land management agencies use
independent programs to manage different public lands, some authors address challenges facing one agency without acknowledging that other agencies have similar
access problems. See, e.g., Merry J. Chavez, Public Access to Landlocked Public
Lands, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (1987) (generalizing land management agencies under a "BLM" label without mentioning that the Forest Service faceR the same problems).
The danger remains that my Note presumes too much similarity. The faultiness
of such a presumption is illustrated by the fact that BLM has proposed more restrictions on claiming R.S. 2477 roads than has the Forest Service. Moreover, the
Forest Service has often been more receptive to public input than BLM in management decisions. Indeed, these agencies have often clashed directly. "AcceRs to the
federal land is a significant and persistent source of friction between the Forest
Service and [BLM] and their neighbors. Present policy, programs, and funding
appear inadequate to resolve these problems in a timely fashion." SHANDS, supra,
at 48. However, though differences exist, the scope of this paper must be limited
to access problems facing both agencies similarly.
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for land access encourages agencies and local governments
to provide better access. Part V further explores the reasons
agencies and interest groups benefit from Garfield County-as well as from other related, proposed actions affecting
land access policy and dispute settlement-and also considers the limitations of the Garfield County litigation solution.

II.

LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION INDICATE TRENDS IN
CESS POLICY

Ac-

A. Informal Agency Policy of Inaction
From the time they were first created, agencies such as
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest
Service have faced the problem of access to and rights of
way on federal lands. Although an effort has been made to
maintain title to traditional rights of way for administrative
purposes, public access, absent a significant management
need, has not been considered "a suitable justification" to
condemn or to litigate access. 5
Land planners recognized as early as the 1960s that
increased use of federal lands would intensify access needs. 6
Accordingly, "several steps [were] taken toward solving this
long-standing problem.''7 There has not been, however, a
consistent policy of clarifying when and under what circumstances public access exists. 8 Until recently, land management agencies have appeared reluctant to pursue litigation
in an effort to quiet title to access routes. 9 This has been
5. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, WYOMING PlTBLIC LAND ACCESS 16 (1989)
[hereinafter WYOMING PlTBLIC LAND ACCESS]; see generally Elk Mountain Safari,
Inc. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 151 (D. Wyo. 1986) (easements given to the
Government for administrative purposes do not necessarily provide public access).
6. In the Federal Roads and Trails Act of 1964, Congress acknowledged that
"construetion and maintenance of an adequate system of roads and trails within
and near the national forests and other lands administered by the Forest Service
is essential if increasing demands for timber, recreation, and other uses of such
lands are to be met." 16 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West 1986).
7. Interior Announces Public Land Access Program, 12 OUR PuBLIC LANDS,
Apr. 1963, at 22 [hereinafter Access Program].
8. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
9. One pragmatic reason not to sue for access is that it often engenders
negative public opinion of the litigating agency. Employees of "grass-roots" land
management agencies live among and associate with local landowners and are
understandably concerned with avoiding the scorn and resentment that results
when neighbors feel the management agency has infringed on their property rights.
However, it is likewise true that neighborly relationships are strained, when
recreationists perceive that employees of management agencies in their communi-
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due, in part, to then Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Leo

Sheep Co. v. United States, which required the government
to obtain access to federal lands by "negotiation, reciprocity
agreements, and the power of eminent domain" rather than
by implication or prescription. 10 Another plausible explanation for this reluctance to pursue litigated outcomes was
that some doubted whether the United States had standing
to sue in the public's behalf for prescriptive access. 11 This
Note takes the position that, on the whole, the standing issue has been an excuse to avoid litigation and an attempt
to preserve resources by leaving access issues undetermined. 12 Considering the increased management problems
created by public use, 13 it is conceivable that agencies
have, in some situations, intentionally allowed access rights
to remain uncertain in order to discourage land use and to
minimize policing burdens. The Forest Service, for example,
has referred to limited access as an effective means of preservation. 14 This management strategy is still visible in Re-

ties are doing nothing to protect their rights to use public lands. A fair and consistent access policy is therefore in the interest of land management employees. Two
recent sources have suggested that such local concerns do, and should, affect environmental policy. See Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a
Community of Values, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81 (Spring 1993); Scott McCallum,
Local Action in a New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 621 (1993).
10. 440 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1979). It is at least plausible that after this decision land management agencies would have been hesitant to claim access by prescriptive as well as implied easement, since either method would seemingly take
land without compensating the private landowner.
11. Doubt as to standing can be seen in Garfield County as well as in earlier
decisions. For example, i.n Garfield County, co-defendant Payne Land and Cattle
Company arj:,rued that "the United States has no standing to assert its cross-claim."
992 F.2d at 1063. Furthermore, Payne Land and Cattle asserted that the district
court had no jurisdiction over the United States' claim that the road in question
was a public highway. ld. Although the jurisdictional defense failed in Garfield
County, lack of jurisdiction was argued successfully in another case. See Standage
Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that a claim
of title under 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1988), commonly referred to as R.S. § 2477-an act
declaring roads across public domain lands to be public highways-"is not alone
enough" to create a federal question). For a discussion of R.S. 2477, see infra part
Il.C and note 28. This finding has indirectly helped create a question of government standing to sue in § 932 cases. To understand the standing question as it
relates to environmental litigation in general, see Roger Beers, Standing and Relat·
eel Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, C855 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 (June 21,
1993).
12. For a discussion of the reasons for and effects of ambiguous access, see
generally TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3.
13. See discussion and accompanying notes infra part V.A.
14. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, NATIONAL FOREST ROADS
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search Natural Areas, where the Forest Service "lets trails
fall into disuse and signs topple" as a means of "returning
the spots to nature." 15
It is now becoming apparent that an ambiguous and
inactive approach is only exacerbating the access problem. 16
According to a 1992 assessment by the General Accounting
Office, "legal public access to somewhat more than fifty million acres of [BLM and Forest Service] lands (or 14% of the
total managed by these agencies) was considered inade··
quate." 17 Access proponents, however, estimate that "40% to
60% of all public land in the West has serious access problems and one-third has no legal overland access at all." 18

B.

The Courts: Letting the Problem Solve Itself

The Executive Branch and its agencies are not the only
entities that have endorsed a laissez faire attitude toward
access to public lands. Then Justice Rehnquist pointed out
in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States that in 1962, "Congress
obviously believed that when development came, it would
occur in a parallel fashion on adjoining public and private
lands and that the process of subdivision, organization of a
polity, and the ordinary pressures of commercial and social
intercourse would work itself into a pattern of access
roads." 19 His statement that the rarity of "litigation over
access questions" in the years preceding Leo Sheep is a
"testament to common sense" suggests that the Court considers the problem one which should sensibly settle itsel£.20 Rather than pointing to policies and other

FOR ALL USES 15 (1986); U.S. DEP"r 01'' AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVWE, ROADS IN
THE NATIONAL F()RESTS 15 (1988).
15. Carrie Casey, RNAs: Lands Left Alone, AM. FORESTS, Nov./Dec. 1992, at
44, 45.
16. See generally TRAVEL MANAGEMEN1', supra note 8.
17. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LANDS: REASONS FOk AND .EF'FECTS OF INADEQUATE PuBLIC ACCESS (Apr. 1992), cited in GEORGE CAMERON
COGGINS ~::r AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 159 (1993); TRAVEL
MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 24 (20 million acres of National Forest do not have
access).
18. Ken Slocum, Battle in the West: Public Lacks Access To Much Public
Land As Ranchers Bar Way, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1980, at A1; see also Chavez,
supra note 4, at 1873 (inadequacy of access to BLM lands); Roger Tippy, Roads
and Recreation, 55 KY. L.J. 799, 804-05 (1967) (considering problems between
preservationists and recreationists).
19. 440
668, 686 (1979).
20. ld. at 686-87.

u.s.
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problem sources, Rehnquist blames the "litigious" times for
making access a judicial issue. 21 However, the problem is
not as easily settled by "common sense" as Rehnquist believed. The judicial policy of leaving access questions to be
settled in the private sector seems to have worked surprisingly well for a time, but the startling explosion of access
litigation in the last fifteen years proclaims that traditional
policies fail to meet modern access needs. 22

C.

Attempts to Legislate Access

Although Justice Rehnquist claims that "the 37th Congress did not anticipate our plight,"23 there have been legislative attempts to provide access. In the Unlawful Enclosures Act of 1885 (UEA), Congress prohibited anyone from
preventing "by force, threats, intimidation, or by any fencing
or inclosing, or any other unlawful means . . . free passage
or transit over or through the public lands.":.l 4 Although
Rehnquist found that the UEA was not "of any significance"
in Leo Sheep, 25 subsequent cases have held that the UEA
forbids landowners from denying access to public land.:.l6
Nevertheless, because the Court has not issued a clear ruling on the application of the Unlawful Enclosures Act, it

21. !d. at 687.
22. "It may seem surprising that for a long time litigation over access questions involving federal lands was rare, but no longer-it seems that there has been
more such litigation in the past fifteen years than in the prior two hundred. Many
of the issues raised ... result from the collision of ancient and modern law and
policy." CoGGINS ET AL., supra note 17, at 145-46.
23. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979).
24. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (West 1986).
25. 440 U.S. at 683. Ironically, just after finding the Unlawful Enclosures Act
of no significance in Leo Sheep, Justice Rehnquist blames Congress for not anticipating the problem of access to federal lands being blocked by private landowners.
26. Stoddard v. United States, 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914) (fencing not lawful
when it denies access to public lands "for lawful purposes"); United States ex ret.
Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (loth Cir. 1988) (fence on private land which
prevented antelope from accessing public land illegal). Although Leo Sheep appears
to definitively hold that UEA does not provide general access to the public lands,
previous cases suggest that UEA prohibits obstruction of access to public lands for
legal purposes. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897). One
knowledgeable source asserts "Leo Sheep may not be definitive . . . . There is a lot
of open space between Leo Sheep and Camfield." Interview with Constance
Lundberg, Professor at Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, in
Provo, Utah (Sept. 8, 1993). See also Ann M. Rochelle, Problems in Acquiring
Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands, 15 LAND &. WATER L.
REV. 119, 133-34 (1980).
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has not yet become a significant tool to open access to public lands.
The need for legislatively defined access arose soon after
public domain lands began passing into private ownership or
being reserved for public purposes. 27 Congress responded
with a single sentence in the Mining Law of 1866, sometimes referred to as R.S. 2477, providing that a "right of
way for the construction of highways over public lands, not
reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."28 Although
R.S. 24 77 was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976,29 state and county governments
can continue to claim rights of way where title had vested
before the statute was repealed. 30
In the second half of the twentieth century, Congress has
taken a more active position on access issues, passing, for
example, the Federal Roads and Trails Act of 196431 and
the National Trails System Act of 1968. 32 In the latter Act,
Congress expressed intent "to provide for the ever-increasing
outdoor recreation needs of an expanding population" by
providing for "public access to" and "travel within" the
"outdoor areas and historic resources of the Nation."33
Some contest, however, that by attempting both to protect
private property interests and to provide public access, the
Courts and Congress together have created an impossible
situation in which, "it is illegal for anybody but the government to ban people from federal land and it is legal to stop
people from crossing private land to reach public land, even

27. For a brief summary of some early access problems, see Leo Sheep Co. v.
United States, 440 U.S. 668, 668-77 (1979) (resulting problems from checkerboard
and other early land grant schemes).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1988) (repealed by FLPMA in 1976) (the Historical Notes
of which include a savings provision indicating that "[r]epeal . . . [is] not to be
construed as terminating any valid lease, permit, patent, etc., existing on Oct. 21,
1976.").
29. Ch. 7, Pub. L. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (1976) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1988)).
30. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1070, 1083 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding
that in order for title to vest in the public, road must have been created before
the land passed into private ownership or was withdrawn from entry under land
laws).
31. 16 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West 1986).
:12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1249 (1988).
3:cl. ld. § 1241.
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if there is no other access." 34 Public reaction to this situation lead to the case of Garfield County.
Ill.

GARFIELD COUNTY AS A REFLECTION OF POLICY

CHANGE

A.

Garfield County: The Epitome of the Access Problem

In Garfield County, a road considered public by the local
populace was blocked by a private landowner in 1960. 35
The public continued to use the road to reach the National
Forest "for hiking, to collect mistletoe, hunt grouse, and
fish." 36 Since the road crossed private property, BLM land
and Forest Service land, 37 Garfield County can conveniently
be applied to either agency. It also illustrates that access
determinations frequently affect both access to federal lands
and access on federal lands. Although this Note mostly addresses the problem of access to federal lands, an understanding that access on federal lands may also be affected
helps one understand why increased access can be considered a "two-edged sword."38

B. Determination of Standing: Incidental But Helpful
It is interesting that the standing ruling was only an
incidental determination in Garfield County. Had the United
States not been named as a defendant in the suit, 39 the
question of government standing in prescription and related
cases may have remained unanswered.
Although the United States was originally named as a
defendant to the County's complaint,40 "because its ultimate
interest paralleled that of the County, the United States
removed this case to federal district court where it was
realigned as a party-plaintiff."41 Mter the district court de34. Slocum, supra note 18, at Al. "The difficulty, [Salt Lake County planners]
say, is ensuring public acc-ess without infringing on the rights of private-property
owners or making development too expensive or difficult." Tom Wharton & Craig
Hansell, Canyon Access Along Wasatch Front Becoming an Uphill Battle, SALT
LAKE TRIB., June 6, 1993, at Al.
35. 992 F.2d at 1065.
36. !d.
37. !d. at 1062-63.
38. See infra text accompanying note 73.
39. 992 F.2d at 1062.
40. !d. at 1062.
41. !d. at 1063.

139]

GARFIELD COUNTY

143

livered an adverse decision, both the county and the federal
government appealed. Significantly, the County withdrew its
appeal, but the United States chose to contest the
defendants' allegations that the federal government lacked
standing. 42 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court
and, in spite of remanding the case on other grounds, ruled
that the United States had standing and was a proper
plaintiff. 43
The original complaint alleged that the United States had
an interest in the case for two reasons: (1) the road in
question crossed federal land, and (2) the road provided essential access to public lands. 44 Taking these points into
consideration, the Tenth Circuit ruled that based on the
road's closure the government satisfied the case-in-controversy requirement-a constitutional requirement which dictates
that plaintiffs and appellants show "some actual or threatened injury" in order to obtain standing in federal courts. 45
This ruling indicates that injury to the public, caused by
closure of a road that "provides the citizens of the United
States and others with an essential, necessary, and unique
access to lands owned by [the] United States,"46 is sufficient to create government standing.
It is important to remember in this context, however,
that the government's argument asserted public rather than
administrative concerns as the basis for adverse possession.
This suggests that the government has overcome its reluctance to sue for primarily "public use."47 The Tenth Circuit
found injury to "public users" and "citizens" satisfactory for
the purposes of meeting the statutory adverse use requirement as well as for creating government standing. 48 Referring to Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co.,49 the Tenth
Circuit further characterized Garfield County as "an action
brought by the federal government to vindicate public rights
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1064.
44. ld. at 1062. By specifically mentioning both that the road crosses federal
land and that it accesses federal land, the court of appeals suggests that the need
for access alone would satisfy the injury in fact determination.
45. ld. at 1064 (referring to U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2 and citing Franchise
Tax Board v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990)).
46. Id.
47. See WYOMING PuBLIC LAND ACCESS, supra note 5, at 16.
48. Garfield County, 992 F.2d at 1064.
49. 614 F.2d 260, 262 (lOth Cir. 1980).
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or public interests" to which "a state's statute of limitations
does not apply." 50 Thus Garfield County removes both
standing and statute of limitations concerns as barriers to
litigating rights of way in behalf of the public for recreational purposes.

IV.
A.

IN THE WAKE OF

GARFIELD COUNTY

Loss of Traditional Access and Increased Use

While timber harvest, grazing, and other traditional uses
have been curtailed on many public lands, recreational uses
have increased. 51 Despite efforts to improve access, 52 some
areas of traditional access have been lost, due to
abandonment53 or closure by development. 54 Time has obscured the construction and use of many R.S. 24 77 roads,
making it difficult to maintain them as public rights of
way. 55 This problem is likely to intensify as more time
passes. It is not likely, however, that recreational demands
on the public lands will decrease. 56

B.

Interested Groups Seek Fulfillment of Access Needs

When national policy favored consumption and privatization of resources, concerned citizens realized that many

50. ld. The court points out that the interest to be vindicated can be either
a fee simple title or an easement. ld.
51. See, e.g., Recreationists Strike It Rich, OUR PuB. LANDS, Fall 1964, at 7
(BLM celebrates improved access for recreation in California).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 23, 28.
53. David Proctor, Forest Service "Proud" Owners of Atlanta Road, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 1993, at lC.
54. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 84, at Al; Craig Hansell, Luxury Home
Development Choking Access to Salt Lake County Canyons, SALT LAKE TRIB., June
6, 1993, at A6. Western states have seen increasing interference with public access as landowners adjacent to the forest attempt to preserve use of public lands
to their own enjoyment at the exclusion of the public.
55. Several cases have struggled with R.S. 2477 road claims where a long
time has passed since the qualifying use or construction. See, e.g., Shultz v. Department of Army, 10 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 1993); Adams v. United States, 687 F.
Supp. 1479 (D. Nev. 1988), affd in part, vacated in part, a F.ad 1254 (9th Cir.
1998) (road not a public highway under R.S. 2477 since it was moved from historic
position); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (lOth Cir. 1988) (question of fact
arose whether there was an easement and what was its scope); United States v.
Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc., 732 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir.
1984) (scope of easement unclear after passing of 83 years).
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; Chavez, supra note 4, at 139495.
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united voices could influence government more than individual voices. Those favoring preservation formed groups like
the Sierra Club and Trout Unlimited. 57 These groups have
swayed agencies toward policies of environmental protection
and limited use. In order to offset these "group dynamics,"
recreationists spoke out through the National Rifle Association (NRA), the National Wildlife Federation, and other
similar organizations. 58 However, the same problems which
warranted expansion of access litigation have fostered a
startling number of new local groups specifically seeking
better access to the public lands.
Local citizen groups like the Wasatch Front Access Team
(WFAT), 59 Save Our Access Rights (SOAR), 60 and the Public Land Access Association, Inc. (PLAAI) 61 have been organized to resolve specific access problems in Utah, Idaho, and
Montana, respectively. Outdoor recreationists, "angry about
being locked out of public lands," are joining with neighbors
to protect "public access to the lands and canyons in their
backyard."62 In response to local pressures, "Forest Service
officials have admonished property owners for denying the
public access to the forest." 63 However, since Garfield
County, concerned citizens can motivate federal agencies and
local counties to do more than merely "admonish."
C.

Public Trust Implications

Some have suggested that the federal government has a
public trust obligation analogous to state governments' obligation of preserving access to waterfronts. 64 Case authority

57. SHANDS, supra note 4, at 53-55.
58. !d.
59. Hansell, supra note 54, at A7.
60. For more information, contact Mr. Craig Shuler, Soda Springs, Idaho (telephone: 208-54 7-304 7).
61. Public Land Access Association, Inc., P.O. Box 3902, Bozeman, MT 597723902. If one pronounces the acronym PLAAI like "play," it becomes an appropriate
and witty name for a group of recreational access proponents.
62. Jon Ure, There's Anger Brewing m Them Thar Hills, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
June 6, 1993, at A7.
63. Hansell, supra note 54, at A7.
64. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A7; see also Ralph W. Johnson et
a!., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State,
67 WASH. L. REV. 521 (1992). But cf Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986).
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suggests a natural law right to enter public lands. 65 While
the public trust doctrine has been considered a principle of
state law, not federal law, 66 it is becoming apparent that
the doctrine can be used to compel an action by both state
and federal governments. 67 An agency's duty to provide access was difficult to assert as long as government standing
to litigate claims of prescriptive and R.S. 2477 roads was in
doubt. When Garfield County cleared up the question of
standing, it raised the question of whether land management agencies have a public trust duty to protect vested
prescriptive and R.S. 24 77 rights of way by means of litigation.

D.

Improved Statutory Compliance

It is beyond the scope of this Note to say whether the
public trust doctrine alone would require the United States
to sue for access. However, the budgetary constraints on use
of eminent domain, 68 coupled with legislation like the 1974
Resources Planning Act (RPA), which requires the Forest
Service to provide for recreational and access needs in longterm land plans, 69 may force the government to seek less
costly means of preserving access. It is becoming apparent
that public interest in recreational uses of federal lands will
pressure agencies to plan for access needs. 70 Access to public lands is no longer an issue that can be left to itself. In
order for federal agencies to fulfill their stewardship in
protecting and providing access to the public lands, they

65. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (citing United States v.
Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884)).
66. Johnson, supra note 64, at 521; Chavez, supra. note 4, at 1885 ("the public trust doctrine has been used to articulate public rights in other governmentregulated natural resources . . . . [T)he applicability of this doctrine to access easements onto public lands is, however, unclear"). For a general history of the public
trust doctrine, see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989).
67. Charles Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, in
HARRISON C. DUNNING, ED., THE PuBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW AND MANAGEMENT: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 169, 177 (1981); Joseph L. Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
An economic argument for the public trust doctrine is given by Lloyd R. Cohen in
The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 289
(1992).
68. Chavez, supra note 4, at 1386.
69. Jay Heinrichs, The Future of Fun, AM. FORESTS, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 21.
70. Id. at 24.
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must step in and referee, or at least have a say in, the
disputes among public land users. To meet the recreational
and traditional demands for access, federal agencies may
find it expedient to use their new-found standing to preserve traditional rights of way through litigation.

V.

A TwO-EDGED SWORD OR A CAT-0'-NINE-TAILS?

A.

Escalated Abuse and Management Requirements

Unfortunately, opening land to public use has also come
to mean opening it to abuse. In recent years, vandalism on
public lands has become a costly problem. 71 Adjacent landowners are often unwilling to allow access "out of a concern
about vandalism and potential liability." 72 Since increased
access may both benefit and challenge public land administrators, public standing to sue for access has been considered a two-edged sword. 73 However, its potential for creating a myriad of land management problems and increasing
public access litigation may prove it to be more like a cato'-nine-tails, a medieval multiple-strand flail used in battle
to inflict widespread and random injury. As zealous access
proponents sue for, and are granted, more access than is
necessary or manageable, management agencies lose control
and the public lands become subject to countless abuses.
Considering its duties to oversee and to protect public
lands, the government is the logical plaintiff in an action
for public access. This arrangement provides several benefits. (1) Costs of settling access conflicts are more equitably
apportioned to the public, the ultimate beneficiaries. (2) Litigation presumptions favorable to the government are already
built into existing legislation: e.g., "[a]ny doubt as to the
scope of the grant under R.S. 2477 must be resolved in
favor of the government."74 (3) State statutes of limitations
would not prevent suit for access. 75 (4) Federal land man-

71. Glenn D. Harris, "Destructive Recreation" On Our Public Forests, AM. FORESTS, Sept./Oct. 1991, at 37.
72. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 17, at 159 (quoting GAO Report). Taking a
self-help approach, some private landowners "have blocked the historic routes" into
public lands. Hansell, supra note 54, at A7.
73. Slocum, supra note 18, at 6.
74. United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, 732 l''.2d
1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1984).
75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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agement agencies would be able to increase access while
maintaining control. Recreationists would be able to use
public lands, yet land management agencies would be able
to avoid many of the problems that would occur if access
WP.re given too liberally.

B.

Public Involvement and Community Awareness Indispensable

To make the government the proper plaintiff, however, is
not to suggest that public interest groups would no longer
have a say in the access issue. Acknowledging the role public interest groups play in monitoring and identifying trends
in national -sentiment, the Forest Service has requested
increased public input in its revision of access policies. 76 If
the public is the intended beneficiary of federal lands, then
federal and county land managers need to know what the
public wants. Cal Schneller, senior planner for Salt Lake
County, points out that planners need to know where people
want trails and access. 77 'What has happened in the past
is that we get development proposals and nobody knows
there is a trail head there or if one is needed. Decisions are
then made accordingly without that information." 78 The
public needs to know its options and make informed recommendations.
Interest groups focus government attention on areas needing access and provide impetus in the search for a solution.
Now that Garfield County has established government
standing to litigate access, interest groups must see to it
that the government will do what it can do, namely, resolve
access conflicts in court, if not by other means. Federal
standing can be a two-edged sword or a cat-o'-nine-tails, but
if it fulfills its promise to combat the inertia besieging the
issue of access to public lands, it will be a formidable weapon in the arsenals of both interest groups and the government.

76. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 16.
77. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A6.
78. ld.

139]
C.

GARFIELD COUNTY

149

A Glance at Related Problems and Possible Solutions

Under a broad reading, Leo Sheep stands for the proposition that the government should acquire access by eminent
domain, rather than by implication or prescription. 79 Until
recently, "[w]hen the Secretary of the Interior has discussed
access rights, his discussion has been colored by the assumption that those rights had to be purchased."80 Exclusive recourse to this method of acquiring access would be
ideal and avoid takings issues. 81 But the costs of this
method, when used exclusively, are prohibitive to federal
land management agencies operating on already tight budgets.82
In his article on mverse condemnation, Michael M.
Berger of Berger & Norton, a law firm in Santa Monica,
California, addresses the general belief that, "if it's for the
public's good, the public should pay for it."83 He recognizes
that "the ever-widening gap between governmental goals and
the economic means to achieve them has resulted in government seeking ever more innovative (read "cost free") ways to
do so."84 In many instances, agencies can provide access to
public lands without creating new rights of way for which
the public should pay. For example, they can preserve or
restore access where there is an existing right of way.
While compensation is generally required when the government appropriates private lands to public uses, it is
hardly equitable to require compensation when claiming
rights of way along roads for which title has already vested
in the public under prescription statutes or under R.S. 2477.
Garfield County will have the most potential sway in this
latter circumstance. Since BLM is in the process of design-

79. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
80. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979).
81. For a leading case on environmental takings, see Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
82. Chavez, supra note 4, at 1375, 1383, 1386 (noting that condemnation
unavailable due to "fiscal constraints" and that agencies do not have funds to solve
access problem by paying for access easements).
83. Michael M. Berger, The Latest About Inverse Condemnation, C791 A.L.I.A.B.A. 99 (1993).
84. ld.
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ing new policy on R.S. 2477 rights of way, 85 this is one
area where timely public input is particularly important.

1.

R.S. 2477 Sunset Provision Darkens Access Outlook

Already, the trend favoring access is being tempered by
efforts to limit the ways it can be established. Currently,
BLM is proposing a sunset provision which would require
counties and public organizations to file on all R.S. 24 77
rights of way by a given date or lose the ability to claim
those routes under this statute. 86 Although it is unclear
whether BLM intends this provision to affect rights of way
across private lands, it apparently intends to definitively
settle disputes of R.S. 24 77 roads on BLM property. While
access proponents, frustrated by the low priority local governments give to establishing access, 87 seek action to clear
up rights of way, they do not want action which would
foreclose the option of accepting R.S. 2477 rights of way.
Ambiguities in the BLM proposal make it hard to tell
whether it will affect access to public lands, but it will
certainly affect transportation on public lands. 88 While it is
doubtful that BLM has jurisdiction to affect R.S. 24 77 roads
across private lands, that agency should consider what coincidental effect the provision will have on these roads. 89
Any action taken without sufficient public involvement
would violate the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act's statutory mandate that BLM give "local governments
and the public adequate notice and opportunity to comment
upon and participate in the formation of plans and programs relating to the management of the public lands."90

85. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON R.S. 2477: THE
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY CLAIMS ON FEDERAL AND
OTHER LANDS (June 199~) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS].
86. !d. at 14.
87. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at Al.
88. Since restricted travel would facilitate designation of more wilderness
lands, wilderness proponents are likely to support a sunset provision.
Recreationists, on the other hand, oppose provisions which make it harder to reach
areas of recreational and scenic interest.
89. For a discussion on how the public can be bound by agency regulations,
see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1311 (1992).
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(0 (1988).
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Because identification of roads created under R.S. 24 77
takes a long time and candidacy of such roads for public acceptance is realized only after use is challenged, a sunset
provision threatens to eliminate public access routes which
presently get little use, but which nonetheless may be badly
needed in the future. 91 Obliteration of dormant access
routes would complicate the access problem and may be
contested as a taking. In order to preserve for future disputes a claim that a right of way was created under R.S.
2477, access proponents must be aware of sunset proposals
and protect themselves by researching and claiming roads
which qualify for public acceptance under that statute.
2.

New County Ordinances

Although the federal government, as administrator of
federal lands, has a duty to provide access, it is not solely
responsible. In order to solve the access problem, both state
and local governments need to include access in land planning and zoning ordinances. This would be consistent with
congressional intent as Justice Rehnquist perceived it in Leo
Sheep. 92 Don Davis, a Salt Lake County Recreation official,
believes that "an ordinance requiring developers to set aside
land for public access 'would make all the difference in the
world.'"93
Others in the Salt Lake area feel that, unless land plans
with "more legal clout to preserve access" are developed,
"only those who can afford upscale homes in the canyons
will have access to public lands behind their properties."94
The Wasatch Front Access Team95 suggests that counties
provide access by (1) "working out easement agreements
with landowners,"96 (2) "using the zoning and development

91. Eliminating future R.S. 2477 claims would be similar in effect to an Idaho statute, now repealed, which stated that R.S. 24 77 claims could be abandoned.
That statute caused conflict over liability for a road along the Middle Fork of the
Boise River in Idaho. For the present solution to that issue, see Proctor, supra
note 53, at Cl. It is unclear, however, what would be required (i.e., a de minimis
filing or claim requirement or more involved proof of right of way) under BLM's
proposal to keep the sun from setting on dormant historical routes.
92. See supra text accompanying note 19.
93. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A6.
94. Id.
95. See supra part IV.B.
96. Hansell, supra note 54, at A6.
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permit process to mandate access,"97 (3) "using land exchanges with private-property owners to acquire property
rights for trail-head developments,"98 and (4) "convincing
landowners that allowing responsible use of rights of way
through their property to canyons can help solve the problem of unwanted use."99 WFAT contends that counties and
landowners will cooperate more freely as they see that
"property values are actually improved when a trail or trail
head is located near a subdivision.'noo But while increased
county attention to access needs can help solve the problem,
increasing litigation indicates the problem is not being resolved merely by relying on local governments.

3.

Better Management by Increased User Fees and Mapping

The Garfield County solution-having the government sue
in the public's behalf-is not and will not become the sole
means of preserving and clarifying access. To be most effective, agencies should combine legal action with other remedies, such as user fees and consistent signing practices.
Many feel that users of public lands should provide for
expanding recreational needs by paying higher user fees. 101
Recreational uses have traditionally been subsidized to cost
visitors little or nothing, but the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 "amended the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, raising recreation fees for a number of
agencies, including the National Park Service and Forest
Service." 102 Since people tend to value what they pay for,
some feel that heightened appreciation and care for recre-

97. ld.
98. ld. This has also proven a successful option for the Forest Service, which
recently negotiated a trail to Mount Olympus in Salt Lake County and has
reached similar agreements in other areas.
99. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A6.
100. ld.
101. "Where public access is possible and we have costs associated with it, we
think it's reasonable that visitors bear the expense." Randy Johnson, Pay to Play:
A Rationale For User Fees, AM. FORESTS, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 52, 72-73 (quoting
Audubon Society policy and identifying others who favor user fees); see also Tami
Gibbons, State Officials Consider Toll Booths in Canyon Areas, DAILY UNIVERSE,
Jan. 13, 1994, at 10 (noting toll collected to fund canyon management and to discourage gang-related abuse).
102. Johnson, supra note 101, at 72.
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ation sites would be a positive side effect of higher user
fees. 103
By giving limited access to some uses, demand for open
public access can be controlled. Where no legal access is
provided, trespass and abuse often increase, and land managers have a harder time doing their job. Many landowners
have improved public relations by providing access. 104 At
times, the best way for private landowners and management
agencies to reduce the impact on private lands and avoid
litigation is to provide carefully planned and identified
means of getting to the public lands on a consistent basis.105
Both BLM and the Forest Service have recognized the
need for better mapping and signing of routes to document
and inform the public of existing access. 106 Unfortunately,
at least in Wyoming, this need has not been adequately
met, for "confusion and contradiction" regarding legal access
abounds. 107 Better posting practices could alleviate many
disputes, but-as is the case with government quiet title
actions, eminent domain, and increased user fees-clearer
posting will not be effective in all circumstances. Without
the cooperation and input of all interested parties, there
will not be a lasting resolution of the access conflict.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For many years litigation of public access was rare, and
a casual approach to the problem by each branch of government was thought sufficient to handle the problem. Increased conflicts in recent years, however, have highlighted
a need for land managers to directly address the access
issue. Steady increase in recreational use and loss of traditional rights of way are fueling the conflict.
In order to preserve traditional access, access proponents
and government agencies must consider alternative means of

103. !d.
104. Acce~<s Program, supra note 7, at 23.
105. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
106. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 15; Access Program, supra note 7,
at 23; Jack Bryant, The Public Lands-Where Are They?, OUR PUB. LANDS, Winter
1965, at 13 (mapping and signing of access roads make land usable, not just "open
to public use").
107. See letter from Bob Williams, Roseville, CA, in Feedback: Questions, Comments and Responses from Our Readers, WYO. WILDLIFE, Feb. 1994, at 5.
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securing and maintaining access. Garfield County, by establishing the government's standing prescriptively to quiet title
by litigation, suggests a judicial remedy to the access
problem. The lack-of-standing excuse is not likely to delay
either prescriptive claims or assertions of an R.S. 2477 right
of way. Increased user fees and improved county planning
promise to alleviate many access problems. Caution is required, however, for while greater access to federal lands
will expand opportunities, it will also magnify the potential
for abuse. Nevertheless, Garfield County sets a useful precedent for concerned citizens to see that land management
agencies develop a policy favoring informed use of the judicial power to preserve traditional public access. Awareness
and cooperation can keep the two-edged sword of public access from becoming a cat-o'-nine-tails.

Laramie D. Merritt

